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Convergence trade, by definition, is buying an asset now to be delivered at some date in the
future and selling a similar asset, to be delivered at the same future date, at a higher price.
In this paper, implementation of bond convergence trade is explored in the South African
market. This is in spite of the features of the South African bond market. The South African
bond market is significantly different from markets where bond convergence trade has
previously been tested. Duration was subsequently introduced in identifying similarities
between bonds, and this is the major difference introduced compared to prior work in the
literature. The results showed that the trades give, on average, negative returns. However,
further investigation into the impact of interest rates not only on the trade, but over the
period of investigation and future expected interest rates, is required, before the results can
be appropriately interpreted.
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A convergence trade by definition is buying an asset now to be delivered at some date in the
future and selling a similar asset also to be delivered at the same future date at a higher
price now. This is done with the expectation that at the future delivery date, the prices will
converge, that is be close to equal, and investors will be indifferent between the two assets.
Therefore the asset delivered from the purchase is used to settle the sale agreement and
the positions are closed out. The investor therefore profits by the differences in selling and
buying prices.
The setup condition, that is the set of rules or conditions that identify a potential trading
opportunity, is the existence of two similar assets that trade at significantly different prices
in the market. The existence of convergence trading opportunities is usually referred to as
arbitrage, even though technically arbitrage refers to trading in identical assets, and
convergence trading can occur when trading in just similar assets. Yet what exactly
constitutes similarity is not usually defined, but is context-specific. Lamont and Thaler
(2003) look at a couple of examples of when similar assets trade at different prices, and the
theory of the "law of one price" that pushes prices to converge.
When the asset refers to bonds, we can structure a new bond-old bond convergence trade.
When a bond is issued, it is referred to as the "new" bond, and the similar bond that was
issued previously is referred to as the "old" bond. One of the interesting features observed
is the premium at which the "new" bond trades compared to the similar "old" bond
currently in the market. Therefore in being in line with the notion of buying cheap and
selling expensive, bond convergence trade involves short selling the new bond when it is
issued and buying the cheaper and similar old bond with identical cash flows as the new











The purpose of the paper is to study the implementation of the bond convergence trade in
the South African market. This work is derived from a similar paper by Krishnamurthy (2002)
in which he studied the profitability of the bond convergence trade in the US market.
Krishnamurthy studied the spread between newly issued 30 year Treasury bonds and old 30
year Treasury bonds that were issued every six months between June 1995 and November
1999. He observed that the spread followed a systematic pattern over each auction cycle,
whereby it begins high at an auction date and converges toward zero at the next auction
date. The profit on going short the new bond and long the old bond is established, and the
trade is rolled over the investigation period. He takes account of differences in repo market
financing rates, which are important in carrying out the trade. There he observed that the
apparent arbitrage opportunity was merely a mispricing that was corrected when
transaction costs were taken into account. Even without transaction costs the expected
profitability was zero. Krishnamurthy then attempts to establish economic reasons for the
apparent mispricing, one of which is the liquidity argument. He claims that the new bonds
are more liquid than the old bonds hence trade at a premium to the old bonds. Secondly is
the fact that the new bonds may be imperfect substitute of the old bonds at auction, and
therefore should not be expected to trade at equal prices at onset.
The trade could not be replicated perfectly in South Africa because of how different the
South African bond market operates compared to the US market. For starters bonds of the
same term and coupon had to be issued at a regular pattern, yet in South Africa there has
not been a time where bonds have been issued at a regular pattern in the recent history
(See for example the Schedule of Domestic Government Bonds as of different years on the
South African National Treasury website, 2010). Duration was subsequently introduced as a
means of identifying similar bonds. Therefore we would select "new" and "old" bonds with
si milar duration, as bonds with similar duration have similar volatility. In wanting to
maximise expected returns whilst maintaining the volatility of a bond portfolio within an











The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In order to fully appreciate market
differences, section two outlines the features of the South African bond market and the
process of the issuance of Government bonds. Section three discusses bonds issued by the
national government in the recent history. Understanding how bonds were issued in the
recent history helped in identifying an appropriate period for investigation and bonds to use
in the trade. Section four analyses the yield spread between new and old bonds. In section
five the actual trade is implemented and section six discusses the outcome of the











2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOND MARKET
2.1 HISTORY AND SOME MARKET STATISTICS
Prior to 2009, the South African secondary bond market was regulated by the Bond
Exchange of South Africa (BESA). BESA was formally licensed in 1996 as an independent
exchange until June 2009 when it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE) (JSE, 2009). BESA operates under the JSE's Interest Rate Markets
Division. The market enables investors to trade in both the cash and the derivatives markets
(JSE, 2009).
The South African bond market is a leader in terms of number of bonds listed and turnover
compared to other emerging market economies. Prior to the conclusion of the transaction
with the JSE in June 2009, there were 1102 listed debt instruments in 2008 with a total
nominal value of R825 billion (JSE, 2009). In 2008, the bond market turnover reported on
BESA reached an annual record of R19.2 trillion. The market is also one of the most liquid in
the world. The turnover ratio can be used as a measure of the liquidity of a bond market.
For instance for government bonds it reflects the total value of government bonds traded in
a particular year of interest divided by the total value of government bonds outstanding at
the end of the previous year. The higher the turnover ratio, the easier it becomes for an
investor to sell a bond in the secondary market. In 2008, the overall turnover ratio for bonds
traded on BESA was 23 up from 17.7 reported in 2007, which is quite high compared to
developed and emerging markets (JSE, 2009).
Of interest in this project are bonds issued by the national government that will form the
basis for the implementation of the convergence trade in South Africa. In 2007 government
bonds accounted for 56.43 per cent of the total nominal value of bonds issued and semi-
government institutions accounted for 10.29 per cent. Government bonds are also the most
actively traded and hence highly liquid; they contributed 93 per cent to total nominal











South Africa has a relatively large domestic market, even compared to some developed
countries. Table 1 shows the sizes of the securities markets at the end of 2006 of some
developed and emerging countries. The table shows that only South Korea has a larger
domestic bond market compared to South Africa, of the emerging countries shown on the
table (van Zyi et al., 2009: 292).
Table 1: Size of securities markets at the end of 2006 (in billions of US dollars)
2.2 ISSUANCE OF GOVERNMENT BONDS THROUGH AUCTIONS
The National Treasury, which is responsible for managing South Africa's national
government finances, has been using a system of primary dealers to issue government
bonds since 1998, to ensure effective distribution of government bond issues. The issues
occur through regular pronounced auctions that take place on Tuesdays, unless Tuesday is a
public holiday in which case the auction would take place on the following business day. The
auctions occur in terms of a calendar schedule issued at the beginning of the year which
includes structured nominal amounts to be issued in that upcoming year. Only primary
dealers can participate in such auctions. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) acts as an











Primary dealers are reputable banking institutions and foreign banks with a branch office
registered in South Africa. These banking institutions must be a member of BESA, apply in
writing to the National Treasury in order to become primary dealers and must fully comply
with regulations set by the National Treasury. As of June 2008, nine banks were operating as
primary dealers'.
Primary dealers must participate actively in auctions by bidding at market-related yields on
a competitive basis. There is a certain minimum and maximum amount that each dealer can
take of the newly auctioned bonds. The minimum is calculated as one divided by the
number of primary dealers plus two percentage points rounded to the nearest one percent.
As there are nine primary dealers, each dealer must bid for at least 13 per cent of the
amount of bonds issued and not more than 40 per cent of the amount of each bid (van Zyl
et al., 2009: 297).
On the Wednesday prior to the auction, invitations to tender are made out which include
bonds to be issued, amounts to be auctioned, closing time for the bids and the
announcement time of the results of the bidding process. Bids are on a yield basis and
would usually close on the following Tuesday at 11h00 a.m. Results of the auctions are
announced publicly within thirty minutes of the closing time. The announcements include
amounts selected by bidders, number of offers to purchase received, number of bids
received, number of successful bids, highest and lowest yield bids, average yield and
percentage allocation at cut-off yield. Following the auction date, 15 per cent of the auction
amount is made available for bidding on a non-competitive basis, whereby the bonds are
issued to interested parties at the average yield of the competitive bids.
Primary dealers in government bonds in South Africa: ABN Bank Limited, Absa Bank Limited,












The primary dealers are then required to quote bid and ask prices in the secondary market
for government bonds; they play a central role in insuring liquidity in the secondary market
for government bonds. Buyers in the secondary market include dealing banks, insurance
companies, retirement funds and investment companies. These institutions buy through
brokers who charge brokerage fees which forms part of transaction costs for the trade, even











3. BONDS ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
3.1. THE SELECTION OF INVESTIGATION PERIOD AND BONDS
In deciding on the period of investigation and bonds for the implementation of the
convergence trade in South Africa, three main constraints had a major impact on the
decision made.
3.1.1 NATIONAL TREASURY STOPPED ISSUING NEW BONDS
The National Treasury of South Africa is organised into nine divisions2; of interest being the
Asset and Liability Management Division. At the end of each month the Asset and Liability
Management Division publishes a Schedule of Domestic Government Bonds in issue.
According to the latest schedule for November 2009, the government has not issued a new
bond since 30 September 2007 when the bonds R154 and the R155 were issued, which
mature on the 31 August 2010 and 31 August 2011. respectively (Treasury, 2010). Instead
what the government has been doing is reopening existing bonds, whereby an additional
nominal amount of a bond already trading in the secondary market is auctioned at
scheduled auctioned dates. This essentially increases the outstanding nominal amount of
the bond, with no change to the coupon rate and term to maturity. The additional amount
can be cleared at a higher or lower yield at auction compared to the yield the same bond is
trading in the secondary market. This would probably depend on demand forces of the
primary dealers at auction. However as soon as the additional amount becomes available in
the secondary market, it cannot be differentiated from the equivalent bond already being
circulated in the secondary market, and therefore does not start a new series of yields but is
added to the old series. Hence if the primary dealer obtained the bond at a higher yield
compared to what it is trading in the secondary market, he will immediately make a profit
when he makes the new lot available in the secondary market.
2 
The nine divisions that comprise the South African National Treasury: Asset and Liability, Budget
Office, Tax, Finance Sector and International Economics, Inter-government Relations, Office of the












However this scenario may not be appropriate for the convergence trade as it involves
i mmediate convergence, and the investor may not have time to set up the long and short
positions for the convergence trade. As soon as the new amount becomes available in the
secondary market, its yield converges to the "old-bond" yield.
3.1.2 IRREGULAR SCHEDULE OF BOND ISSUES
The National Treasury does not issue bonds at a fixed regular schedule. In the article by
Krishnamurthy (2002), "The Bond/Old-Bond Spread", he focused on 30 year Treasury bonds
issued over a period from June 1996 to November 1999 by the US government over six
month auction cycles. In the South African government bond market, there has not been a
period where bonds have been issued in this manner of late. In fact there is no fixed
schedule for the issue of bonds that is repeated each year, instead the government issues a
new schedule at the beginning of the year for scheduled bond issues. It is likely that these
would be based on the budgetary constraints of the government in that particularly year.
3.1.3 VARIABLE BOND ISSUES
Bonds issued of late vary in coupon size and term to maturity. In analysing the schedules
available on the Treasury website, the year 2002 was the only year recently where new
bonds with the same coupon rate and term to maturity of an existing bond in the secondary
market were issued (Treasury, 2009). This would be an ideal scenario for the convergence
trade; however there were two constraints. Firstly this was the only year that this was
observed and in none of the years that followed, so the trade would not be capable of being
repeated. Secondly it was not possible to obtain auction yields for these bonds. It appears
that the data providers used (Rueters, MacGregar and Datastream) started to formally
archive auction data for South Africa auction yields from 2003 onwards, as the majority of











The above three constraints restricted the period of analysis in South Africa from 2003, as it
was from then auction data was available, to 2007 as no new issues were made after 2007.
This is a relatively short period with only five cycles included in the analysis, but do show
intriguing results as shown below.
Table 2: Data Summary
Number of auction cycles 5
Average size of issue R 330 million
Average days between auctions 297.5
Average yield spread -0.03%
Average new bond repo rate 8.36%
Average old bond reverse repo rate 8.00%
3.2 USING DURATION AS A SELECTION CRITERIA
As the bonds issued of late vary in coupon size and term to maturity, another basis for
selecting bonds to use in the trade had to be used. Duration, which can be interpreted as a
measure of how long on average the bondholder has to wait before receiving cash flows
(Hull, 2009: 87), came to mind to use as basis. The argument for using duration was as
follows; given the following relationship:
Where B equals the price of the bond obtained by discounting future bond cash flows ci











The relationship states that for a one unit change in the yield OA the relative change in
LIB
the bond price ( B ) equals the negative of the duration (D ). This relationship is good for
small parallel changes in yield, however for larger movements in yield there is a need to look
at higher order terms in the Taylor series expansion of the bond price B ( Wilmott, 2006:
236). Therefore bonds with similar duration will experience similar percentage changes in
price due to the same small change in yield. The duration of a bond portfolio is equal to the
weighted average of the durations of individual bonds in the portfolio, with weights
proportional to bond prices (Hull, 2009: 87). In wanting to maintain the sensitivity of a bond
portfolio to small parallel changes in the yield within a specific range, whilst adapting the
convergence trade, this can be achieved by switching between bonds with similar duration,
that fall within a specific range.
This is the rationale for using duration as a selection criterion. This should theoretically limit
the exposure of the portfolio to small changes in yield within a specific range. The aim is to
enhance the expected return of the bond portfolio whilst maintaining the sensitivity of the
portfolio to small yield changes within acceptable bounds. However this would only work for
small parallel changes in the yield curve. When the yield curve changes shape, the argument
may no longer hold.
In analysing bonds issued between 2003 and 2007, it was noted that the majority of bonds
had duration that fell between 7-9 years. Therefore in wanting to maximise the number of
cycles and therefore the number of times positions are switched; switch positions between
new and old issues with duration of between 7-9 years. If in any year no issues occur,
unwind the positions once duration of the previous new bond drops below seven years.
Over the period 2003 to 2007, the bonds shown on table 3 were selected that satisfied the
above criteria with each pair representing a cycle pair. The duration is calculated as at the
settlement date. In appendix A the calculations are given for other bonds as at the
settlement date. Hence the bond with the closest duration to the new bond and with




















4. ANALYSIS OF THE BOND SPREAD
For each bond issue, there is an auction date and an issue date. According to G-30
recommendations 3, financial settlement has to take place three working days after the
transaction date, in this case the auction date. The bonds are then issued to successful
bidders on the issue date. In an electronic trading system, there is no need to wait until the
bond certificates are issued for trading on the bond to commence. Hence each auction cycle
begins on the auction date and not on the issue date. Figure 1 provides a record of the
spread between old and new bonds over the historical period of interest defined as (yield of
old bond — yield of new bond). If indeed the liquidity argument (Krishnamurthy, 2002) holds,
whereby he argues that bidders have a high demand for new bonds because the new bonds
are more liquid than the old bonds, than the yield of new bonds should be lower than the
yield of the old bond. This is because bidders will bid the price of new bonds higher than the
old bond due to high demand, and therefore by the inverse relationship between bond price
and yield, produce a lower yield.
The trade begins with the R201 as the new bond auctioned on the 27 May 2003, and the
R157 which was issued on the 24 October 2001. as the old bond. The spread starts at -0.15
per cent and diverges to -0.215 per cent on the day of the next auction date, which is 4 May
2004. The next cycle has the R203 as the new bond auctioned on the 4 May 2004, and the
previous new bond the R201 as the old bond. In this case the spread starts at -0.069 per
cent and again diverges to -0.264 per cent on the day before the next auction date, which is
9 August 2004. These two cycles violates the conditions for the convergence trade as the
spreads and hence prices must converge not diverge. Than on the 10 August 2004 the R204
is auctioned, with the R203 as the old bond. The spread of the yields for these two bonds
does not show any significant pattern. This also holds for the last two auction cycles, with
the R207 auctioned on the 17 June 2005 and the R204 being the old bond, and when the
R208 is auctioned on the 29 August 2006 with the R207 as the old bond.
3 The Group of 30 (G-30) is a private organisation which is sponsored by central banks and major commercial
and investment banks. The group developed an international task force that developed fast, standardised





















The convergence trade essentially involves the shorting of the newly issued bond, and
purchasing the old bond on an auction date. Both these positions are financed in the repo
market, using repo and reverse repo rates to finance the long and short positions
respectively. The positions are then unwound on the next auction date, or when duration of
the new bond falls below seven years if no issue occurs in a particular year. But firstly the
dynamics for creating short positions in the trade and the criteria used to select reverse
repo rates are outlined below.
5.1 THE REPO MARKET AND CREATING A SHORT POSITION IN A BOND
Creating a short position in a bond involves two transactions, namely a sale and a reverse
repo. The bond is sold in the Treasury market and settlement is the following day. When it is
ti me to deliver on the bond the following day, the investor borrows the bond from another
investor who owns the bond and agrees to return the bond the following day. This would
typically involve the borrower depositing cash equal to the value of the bonds with the
investor from whom he borrowed the bonds. This borrowing transaction is known as the
reverse repo. Settlement on this transaction is the same day. Therefore the investor
establishes a short position as he has sold a bond that he has borrowed from another
investor. lithe short position is reversed the following day, the investor purchases back the
bonds for settlement the following day, and deliver the bond to the investor from whom he
borrowed the bonds. The investor would then receive the cash deposited with the bond
owner plus interest at the reverse repo rate. The cash would be used to settle the purchase.
What is important to note is the limitation of the number of shorts that can be achieved in
the repo market, which is limited by the quantity of new bonds available for shorting. In
practice the quantity of new bonds available for shorting may be different from the quantity
newly issued by the government, mainly because of two reasons. First not all new bonds will
be available for lending in the repo market, yet as the repo market clears throughout the











Therefore if demand for the new bond equals the supply, an investor holding the new bond
is indifferent between lending out the bond at the risk-free rate and holding the bond. This
is due to the fact that when demand equals supply, the overnight financing rate on the
amount deposited with him, in other words the amount of interest he must give to the
investor who deposited the funds with him, equals the risk-free rate which is the rate he
would earn if he were to deposit the funds obtained from the borrower at the risk-free
overnight rate.
However if demand for the bonds exceeds supply, than the bondholder makes a premium
on lending out the bond as the financing rate falls below the risk free rate, in which case he
makes an extra premium equal to the difference between the two rates. This is known as
"special" and the extent of specialness is measured as
Therefore only bonds with a high demand in the repo market will have repo rates below
overnight riskless rates, enabling the holder of the bond to make a premium on lending out
the bonds and to enable the ration of the scarce supply of the bonds. This implies that the
higher the demand for the new bond, which would result in a higher yield spread at auction
to the old bond, the higher the specialness of the new bond and hence the cost of creating a
short position. This argument was used in suggesting that a high spread at auction between
the new and old bond does not imply that the trade would be profitable, as the cost of
shorting the bond in the repo market would subsequently increase (Krishnamurthy, 2002).
The theory behind the convergence trade is that because the newly issued bond is more
expensive than the equivalent old bond in the market, then by normal economic intuition,
we should buy cheap and sell expensive. Therefore the trade involves a long position in the
old bond and a short position in the new bond. The long position is financed using repo











the reverse repo, the South African overnight deposit rate was used as a proxy for the
reverse repo rate used to finance the short position. This is because the investor borrowing
the bonds deposits an amount equivalent to the value of the bonds with the bondholder
and unwinds the position the following day. It is interesting to note that the overnight
deposit rate is consistently below the repo rate (see appendix B). In the appendix (B) the
profits on the trade had both positions been financed using the repo rate is given. The
profitability graph shown in the appendix does not differ significantly as compared to that











The total profit from the convergence trade at date tit +1 is the sum of the above two
quantities.
The holdings for the new bond are restricted by the size of the new issue, however we can






















Previous implementation of the convergence trade in the United States market
(Krishnamurthy, 2002) show that on average the trade had expected return of zero, even
when transaction costs were not taken into account. However implementation of the trade
in South Africa shows that the trade would give on average negative returns. Figure 2 below
shows the daily profits from the implementation of the trade, with the vertical lines
representing auction dates.
There is a distinct pattern in the results, but what stands out is the fact that the trade is not
profitable; in fact it gives consistently negative returns. For all auction cycles, the daily
profits start at some level that is close to zero, and diverges to negative territory. These
results suggest that the trade could be profitable in South Africa if the holdings are reversed,











bond. However it still remains questionable on how to interpret this outcome. The question
is whether to conclude that the convergence trade is profitable in the South African market
or not. This is hard to conclude because a modification was introduced in implementing the
trade in the South African market. As such it would be doubtful to claim that the
convergence trade is profitable in South Africa, even though previous implementation in
other markets (Krishnamurthy, 2002) showed otherwise, without appreciating the fact that
duration was introduced in selecting bonds to use in the trade due to limitations of the












In the paper the bond convergence trade was implemented in the South African market.
This was done in spite of the features of the South African market that did not support the
i mplementation of the original trade. Duration was introduced as selection criteria because
of the rationale that investors wanting to increase the expected return of a bond portfolio,
whilst maintaining the volatility of the portfolio within an acceptable range can implement
the trade with bonds of similar duration. The duration term chosen was purely data specific
in that over the selected period of investigation the majority of the bonds had duration that
fell between seven to nine years.
The trade showed negative average profitability. The convergence trade could perhaps be
profitable if the bond positions were reversed. Yet further investigations need to be done in
this regard. In particular we would need to investigate the impact of interest rates not only
on the trade, but over the period of investigation and future expected interest rates. Future
interest rates impacts on the duration calculation and on the profits made on each position.
There were limitations in attempting to implement the convergence trade in the South
African market. Obtaining data, particularly auction and yield data for the older issues, was
the biggest obstacle. In some cases we combined segments of the time series from various
sources to obtain the full history. As mentioned, the use of the duration term was data
specific, and that pattern need not be repeated in the future. Therefore an investor wanting
to replicate the convergence trade in South Africa needs to appreciate the limitations as
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Each column represents a list of government bonds with duration calculated as at the settlement
date of the new bond, which is the first bond given in which column. At settlement the bond whose
duration was similar to the newly issued bond and was between 7-9 years was selected to be the old
bond.
Cycle one 	Cycle two
2003_R201 	2004_R203
Settlement date 27-May-03 	Settlement date 05-May-04
Maturity date 21-Dec-14 Maturity date 15-Sep-17
Coupon (%) 8.75% 	Coupon (%) 8.25%
Average yield (%) 0.0964 	Average yield (%) 0.0996
Frequency 2 	Frequency 2
Basis 3 	Basis 3
Duration 7.077701454 	Duration 7.869139301
Modified Modified
duration 6.752243326 duration 	7.495846162
R159P 	R 201
Settlement date 27-May-03 	Settlement date 05-May-04
Maturity date 15-Sep-16 	Maturity date 21-Dec-14
Coupon (%) 13.50% 	Coupon (%) 8.75%
Average yield (%) 9.66% 	Average yield (%) 0.098912363
Frequency 2 	Frequency 2
Basis 3 	Basis 3
Duration 7.123692398 	Duration 6.743905039
Modified Modified
duration   6.795471142 	duration 6.426094921 
R 157 	R159P
Settlement date 27-May-03 	Settlement date 07-May-04
Maturity date 15-Sep-16 	Maturity date 15-Sep-16
Coupon (%) 13.50% 	Coupon (%) 13.50%
Average yield (%) 0.094902117 	Average yield (%) 10.08%
Frequency 2 	Frequency 2
Basis 3 	Basis 3
Duration 7.158650634 	Duration 6.816992401
Modified Modified












Settlement date 27-May-03 Settlement date 07-May-04
Maturity date 15-Sep-14 Maturity date 07-Dec-23
Coupon (%) 13.50% Coupon (%) 5.50%
Average yield (%) 9.66% Average yield (%) 10.08%
Frequency 2 Frequency 2
Basis 3 Basis 3
Duration 6.525810148 Duration 9.698006887
Modified Modified
duration 6.225136075 duration 9.232679824
R179 R189
Settlement date 27-May-03 Settlement date 07-May-04
Maturity date 01-Aug-13 Maturity date 31-Mar-13
Coupon (%) 10.00% Coupon (%) 6.25%
Average yield (%) 9.66% Average yield (%) 10.04%
Frequency 2 Frequency 2
Basis 3 Basis 3
Duration 6.459806526 Duration 6.603564741
Modified Modified
duration 6.162173544 duration 6.28791158
R 189
Settlement date 27-May-03
Maturity date , 31-Mar-13
Coupon (%) 6.25%






Cycle three Cycle four
2004_R204 2005_R207
Settlement date 10-Aug-04 Settlement date 17-Jun-05
Maturity date 21-Dec-18 Maturity date 15-Jun-20
Coupon (%) 8.00% Coupon (%) 7.25%
Average yield (%) 0.09845 Average yield (%) 0.0802
Frequency 2 Frequency 2
Basis 3 Basis 3
Duration 8.226496481 Duration 9.166621959
Modified Modified












Settlement date 10-Aug-04 Settlement date 17-Jun-05
Maturity date 15-Sep-17 Maturity date 21-Dec-18
Coupon (%) 8.25% Coupon (%) 8.00%
Average yield (%) 0.0986 Average yield (%) 0.0804
Frequency 2 Frequency 2
Basis 3 Basis 3
Duration 7.625353002 Duration 8.167702043
Modified Modified
duration 7.267085678 duration 7.852049647
R201 R186
Settlement date 13-Aug-04 Settlement date 17-Jun-05
Maturity date 21-Dec-14 Maturity date 21-Dec-25
Coupon (%) 8.75% Coupon (%) 10.50%
Average yield (%) 10.46% Average yield (%) 8.03%
Frequency 2 Frequency 2
Basis 3 Basis 3
Duration 6.710322939 Duration 9.489900906
Modified Modified
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